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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The Respondent's brief and the concurrent effort to 
"supplement" the record do not demonstrate that the Appellant 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial with 
an understanding of the nature and effect of that waiver. The 
Respondent endeavors to supplement the record pursuant to Rule 
11(h) of the Rules of the Supreme Court. However, the trial court 
procedure with respect to the "waiver" falls short of the 
constitutional standard imposed upon trial courts to determine 
whether the waiver was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 
entered. 
Despite efforts of the Respondent to sustain the sufficiency 
of the evidence on appeal, the Appellant renews his argument that 
the evidence falls woefully short of the standard required to 
support and sustain a conviction for murder in the first degree. 
Furthermore, Appellant contends that it follows that if the 
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evidence will not support a conviction for murder in the first 
degree it likewise will not support convictions for 
communications fraud or making a false or fraudulent insurance 
claim because the elements of each of the latter two offenses rely 
upon the homicide as providing the essential element constituting 
the fraud. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENT'S BRIEF DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
OR HIS DECISION CONCERNING A WAIVER, IF ANY, WAS MADE 
WITH A KNOWLEDGE OF HIS RIGHT TO SUCH A JURY TRIAL. 
FURTHERMORE, THE RESPONDENT'S EFFORTS TO SUPPLEMENT THE 
RECORD BY CREATING A NEW RECORD IS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE 
AND APPELLANT'S SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS AND DUE PROCESS WERE 
DENIED. 
In his Appellant's Brief Appellant argues that Section 77-
35-17(c), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides that a 
Defendant charged with a felony is entitled to a jury trial absent 
a showing that the Defendant waived a jury in open court with the 
approval of the court and with the consent of the prosecution. 
Apparently conceding that the record was silent as to a waiver by 
the Appellant of his right to a jury trial in the trial below, the 
Respondent sought to remand the appeal to the trial court for the 
purpose of supplementing the record. (R. 134). 
Upon remand the Appellant objected to efforts of the 
Respondent to create a new record because the certified court 
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reporter who had recorded the trial and ancillary proceedings in 
the trial court had already certified the record to the Utah 
Supreme Court and there was no record of any proceedings where 
Appellant had waived his constitutional right to a jury trial nor 
were there any proceedings advising the Appellant of his rights 
relative to such a waiver. (R. 136). Appellant further objected 
to the Respondent's efforts to create a record where none existed 
because counsel for the Respondent had advised the Utah Supreme 
Court at the hearing on the motion to remand that no effort was 
being made to create a record. The Respondent was merely seeking 
to determine whether or not the certified court reporter had 
reported and transcribed all matters of record. (R. 134). 
Affidavits were filed by trial counsel/ both for the 
Appellant and for the Respondent/ and the Appellant also filed an 
affidavit relating to the procedures followed by the trial court 
on the waiver issue. Appellant's trial counsel verified that he 
met with the trial judge and the prosecutor on the morning of the 
commencement of the trial. (R. 137, 144). The Appellant was not 
present during counsel's meeting with the trial judge or 
thereafter, and the trial court was simply notified that Appellant 
intended to waive his jury trial. Trial defense counsel then 
verifies in two separate affidavits that no further inquiry was 
had by the trial court and the trial proceeded without a jury. 
(R. 137, 144) . 
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By affidavit the prosecutor confirms that the meeting with 
the trial judge did not occur on the record or in open court, but 
was held in chambers. (R. 141). However, the prosecutor states 
that the Appellant was present at the conference in chambers. 
Notably the prosecutor does not allege or affirm that any inquiry 
was made by the trial judge as to the basis for the Appellant's 
waiver or his knowledge and understanding of his right to a jury 
trial. The prosecutor simply states that "the Court addressed Mr. 
Moosman on whether he intended to waive his right to a jury. The 
defendant said he did. The Court then adjourned to the courtroom 
to commence trial." (R. 141). 
The Appellant filed his own affidavit stating that he was not 
present at any conference or hearing, in open court or otherwise, 
with the trial judge or prosecutor where his waiver of a jury trial 
was discussed. Furthermore, he affirmed that no inquiry was made 
as to whether he understood his constitutional or statutory right 
to a jury trial. (R. 143). 
Despite the weight ot the evidence, including tne 
prosecutor's statement that the trial judge merely asked the 
Appellant if he intended to waive the jury and nothing more, the 
trial judge issued written findings in the form of a memorandum 
decision that the Appellant had been informed of his right to a 
jury trial by the trial judge and the effect of his waiver. (R. 
146). Thereupon, the matter was remanded to the Supreme Court 
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without the opportunity of the Appellant to take exception to the 
f i nd i ng s. 
The Appellant submits that the procedure employed by the 
Respondent and the trial court in creating a new record do not 
conform to the intent of Rule 11(h) of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court. The Appellant further submits that the procedures 
employed by the Respondent have not found prior favor with the 
Utah Supreme Court or the Utah Court of Appeals. 
In Hansen vs. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988)f where a 
discussion had been held in chambers between trial counsel and the 
trial judge during the trial of a case in the First Judicial 
District out of the presence of the court reporter and objections 
had there been made to certain jury instructions and the exact 
nature objection had not been made clear, the Utah Supreme Court 
on appeal refused to allow the supplementation of the trial 
record. There, as in the instant case, the parties could not 
agree on what transpired in chambers, and the Supreme Court stated 
that it was incumbent upon the aggrieved party to preserve the 
record. They did not, and the court would not consider their 
challenge to the jury instructions. (Id. at 17). 
In the instant case, it was incumbent upon the prosecutor to 
preserve the record below. Where the parties cannot agree upon 
the proceedings in chambers, even as to who was present and the 
substance of the conference, this court should not permit the 
supplementation of the record below. 
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See also Birch vs. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989), in 
which the Utah Court of Appeals held that relief from a judgment 
would not be granted based upon an alleged statement made by the 
trial judge during in camera discussions between the husband and 
wife in a divorce case where no record was made of the discussion. 
In Birch the court stated that " . . . a record should be made of 
all proceedings of courts of record" and that "that precept applies 
to conferences in chambers as well as more formal proceedings." 
(Id. at 1116). Appellant urges this court to disallow the 
supplementation sought by the Respondent. As stated earlier, 
neither trial counsel, the Appellant nor the trial judge can agree 
upon what transpired in chambers without a court reporter as it 
relates to the issue of a knowing or voluntary waiver by the 
Appellant of his right to jury trial. Even the prosecutor's 
affidavit and proffer under Rule 11(h) of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court seems to contradict the findings of the trial judge on the 
question of whether the trial judge advised the Appellant of his 
constitutional and statutory rights. Because neither the counsel 
for the parties nor the judge can agree on the substance of the 
meeting in chambers, this court should disallow the trial judge's 
findings. See Hansen, Supra. 
The Appellant in his brief previously filed with the court 
has cited a number of cases supportive of a finding that the trial 
court erred in the procedures it employed in proceeding to try the 
Appellant without a jury where the Appellant did not waive his 
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right to a jury in open court and did not do so knowingly or 
voluntarily. Each rebuts the Respondent's argument that the waiver 
was knowingly and voluntarily made. 
POINT II 
DESPITE THE RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT TO THE CONTRARY THE 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF FIRST DEGREE 
MURDER AND A FORTIORI DOES NOT SUPPORT FINDINGS OF GUILTY 
TO COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD AND FALSE OR FRAUDULENT INSURANCE 
CLAIM. 
In his brief previously filed with the court the Appellant 
has cited this court to its decision in State vs. Walker, 743 P. 2d 
191 (Utah 1987), and to the Utah Court of Appeals decision, State 
vs. Wright, 744 P.2d 315 (Utah App. 1987), both of which enunciate 
the rule that verdicts from bench trials in criminal cases are 
subject to review under the "clearly erroneous" standard specified 
in Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Appellant argued in his brief originally filed with this 
court that a careful scrutiny of the record in the instant case 
discloses a number of erroneous findings by the trial court which 
are not supported by the evidence introduced at trial. The 
Respondent takes exception to the Appellant's argument and the 
Appellant's citation of the court to the trial court's findings. 
Nevertheless, the Appellant submits that the evidence does not 
support the trier of fact's findings. 
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At page 1647 of the transcript, the trial judge ostensibly 
refers to the testimony of Trooper Robert Dahle, a Utah Highway 
Patrolman who reconstructed the accident as an expert witness for 
prosecution. (See Trooper Dahle's testimony at Tr. pp 661-766). 
There are sharp contradictions, however, in Trooper Dahle's 
testimony and the testimony of Dr. Reynold K. Watkins, a professor 
of engineering and former head of the engineering department at 
Utah State University in Logan who testified in behalf of the 
Appellant and reconstructed the accident. (See Dr. Watkins 
testimony at Tr. 1146-1212). 
The trial judge found that the abrupt turning of the car by 
the Appellant constituted an "intentional part on the part of the 
driver of running the car off the road with the passenger in it 
with an escape route for himself" at a point which the trial judge 
described as " . . . one of the most dangerous parts in Logan 
Canyon, at a point conveniently just past the guardrail, at a point 
where an exit could be made if you do it quickly enough just as 
the car turns, in which you might let go of the steering wheel just 
as it existed (sic) off the shoulder of the road . . ." 
(Tr. pg 1647) . 
Neither expert witness testified as to facts which would 
support the trial judge's finding. Trooper Dahle did state that 
the movement of the vehicle off of the roadway would have been a 
left to right movement. (Tr. 675). He even states that the 
movement would have been caused by an abrupt movement of the 
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steering wheel from left to right causing a sideslip, and although 
such a movement could be consistent wicn an intentional act, 
Trooper Dahle testified that the movement could have been 
accidental resulting from dozing or falling asleep at the wheel. 
(Tr. 677, 730). Trooper Dahle, however, cannot place the vehicle 
on a specific portion of the roadway at the time the turn is 
begun, and acknowledges that the turn could have been less acute 
depending upon where the vehicle was on the roadway when the left 
to right movement began. (Tr. 720). Dr. Watkins upon recross-
examination by the prosecution testified that the scuff mark to 
which Trooper Dahle had testified "could have been caused by 
someone falling asleep, a driver who was falling asleep." (Tr. 
1209). 
Except for and obscure reference by Trooper Dahle to the 
curve just east of the accident site being the sharpest curve in 
the canyon (Tr. 686-87), the transcript of the proceedings is 
silent with respect to evidence supporting the trial court's 
finding that this area of the Logan Canyon is one of the most 
dangerous parts in the canyon. There simply was no testimony 
presented by either the prosecution or the defense to support this 
"fact". Neither was there testimony that the fall down the 
embankment was at a point conveniently past the guardrail, 
although there was testimony that there have been changes of the 
road conditions, including the adding of a guardrail. (Tr. 1201). 
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The facts are that the accident occurred during hours of 
darkness on a roadway which was not illuminated except by the 
headlights of the appellant's truck. The experts did not agree 
on the speed of the Appellant's vehicle. Trooper Dahle placed 
the speed at a "high side or . . . maximum side of 27 miles per 
hour to 22 miles per hour on the low side." (Tr. 673). Dr. 
Watkins placed the speed at 28 to 30 miles per hour at the time 
the vehicle left the roadway. (Tr. 1162). The trial court found 
the slower speed to be the speed of the Appellant's vehicle and 
found that speed, 22 and 27 miles per hour, to be significant. 
(Tr. 1646). Irrespective of the speed of the speed of the Moosman 
vehicle, either the Watkins speed or the Dahle speed, it was the 
opinion of the expert witnesses that the appellant would have left 
the vehicle at the same rate of speed as the vehicle from which he 
left. The appellant submits that based upon the evidence presented 
at trial there is no basis for the court to have found that the 
appellant calculated his exit from the vehicle to coincide with 
his being at a location "conveniently beyond the guardrail" where 
the appellant could jump at the least risk to himself. (Tr. pp 
1647, 1650-510) 
Such a finding is a strained interpretation of the evidence. 
The expert witnesses produced by both the prosecution and the 
defense agreed that the defendant's reaction time and the physics 
of the accident would have prevented the appellant from opening 
the truck door and jumping out before the truck left the pavement. 
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Furthermore, the darkness of the canyon and the speed of the 
vehicle when control was lost mitigate against a finding that the 
appellant jumped clear of the out of control truck into an area 
predetermined by the appellant to have provided himself a safe 
escape. 
The trial court places great weight upon the testimony of the 
state medical examiner in concluding that Mrs. Moosman's wounds 
were caused by having been struck by a blunt instrument and not by 
the accident itself or the action of a body rolling over in the 
stream on the rocks. (Tr. 1648-1650) The appellant submits, 
however, that Dr. Sweeney did not have sufficient contact with the 
Mrs. Moosman during the autopsy examination to have formed an 
opinion as to cause of death. In fact, Dr. Sweeney testified that 
Mrs. Moosman died from drowning. (Tr. 1021-1022). 
Another "fact" relied upon by the trial court to sustain the 
conviction was the physical appearance of the Defendant as 
described by Dr. Bishop contrasted with the Appellants own 
testimony. (Tr. 1644). 
Dr. Bishop, the emergency room physician who attended to the 
Appellant on the morning of the accident at approximately one 
a.m., described the Appellant as being "covered with dust or dirt 
from head to toe . . . lightly covered and not mudcaked." (Tr. 
494G-494H). The trial judge found that testimony to be 
"inconsistent with the Defendant's testimony that he had been 
wading up and down the river to get out and finding a way to get 
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out, that he'd come up to chest level in the water, which would 
make all of his clothes wet," (Tr. 1644). 
In so finding, the trial totally ignores the testimony of the 
Appellant. The accident occurred at approximately 8:30 p.m. (Tr. 
671, 899-900). At approximately 1:00 p.m. the Appellant saw Dr. 
Bishop. (Tr. 494G). During the intervening period the Appellant 
climbed from the highway down to the river to provide assistance 
to his wife. (See Respondent's Brief, Statement of Facts, pp. 
4-5). It is not unreasonable to assume that water from the river 
which would have caused his clothing to get wet would dry by normal 
evaporation. Similarly, dirt which would have accumulated on his 
clothing would dry and become somewhat dusty. 
The trial judge stated that the Appellant's demeanor and 
reactions were sufficient to arouse Bishop's suspicions and cause 
him to report his concerns to the authorities (Tr. 1644-45), when 
in fact it was not the Defendant's demeanor or reactions that 
prompted the report, but a telephone call received by Bishop from 
a third party, one Dr. Graves who had previously employed Mrs. 
Moosman. (Tr. 496-97). Dr. Bishop later testified as to a visit 
he made to the accident scene and offered testimony concerning the 
soils at the scene and compared those soils with the dirt on 
Defendant's clothing. (Tr. 498-98). However, there was no 
scientific basis for the comparison. Dr. Bishop had no expertise. 
Finally, the Respondent quotes Terry Carlsen, a witness for 
the prosecution, who testified that the Appellant had told Carlsen 
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on several different occasions in the months prior to Mrs. 
Moosman's death that he might kill her so that it would appear to 
be either an accident or the act of some other person. (Tr. 
29-33). Carlsen claimed that the Appellant had told him that he 
(Appellant) had insurance on Mrs. Moosman's life and that would 
provide him with money to purchase property he wanted. (Tr. 
23-24) . Carlsen also testified that Appellant took out a term life 
insurance policy on Mrs. Moosman's life and a whole life policy on 
his own life in January 1985 each worth $100,000.00. (Tr. 125, 
136). 
Despite the fact that the Respondent apparently places 
credence in Carlsen1s testimony, the trial court expressed his 
reservations about Carlsen's credibility. (Tr. 1643). The court 
expresses his concern as to Carlsen's truthfulness and states 
there is not much weight to be given to his testimony. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 77-35-17 (c) of the Utah Code is specific as to the 
requirements for a waiver of a jury trial in felony matters. 
Despite efforts of the Respondent to supplement the record and 
create a record supporting its contention that the Appellant 
waived the jury trial with a knowledge and understanding of such 
a waiver, the record does not support such a finding. The 
procedures employed by the trial court were defective on the issue 
of waiver, and the Supreme Court should disallow the attempts to 
create a new record. Similarly, it should find that there was not 
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a proper waiver and the case should be reversed because of the 
defect in protecting the record and the Appellant's rights. 
In the absence of a jury, the trial court proceeded to hear 
evidence and found the appellant guilty of each of the counts 
alleged in the information. However, the appellant submits that 
the evidence upon which the trial court based its finding of guilt 
was insufficient to support the conviction on any of the three 
counts. The appellant contends that constitutionally impaneled 
jury would have viewed the evidence differently than the trial 
court sitting without a jury and that the evidence heard by the 
trial judge sitting without a jury fails to establish clearly or 
convincingly that the Appellant is guilty of the crimes charged. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / f ^ day of February, 1990. 
<^^HJ-<au*, 
Robert W. Gutke 
Attorney for Appellant 
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